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Abstract
We analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure
in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The
focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licenses.
Moreover, we study how the auction format a¤ects the incentives for explicit
or tacit collusion among incumbents. A crucial role is played by the relation
between the number of incumbents and the number of licenses. If the
number of incumbents is greater than the number of new licenses, we show
that auctioning more licenses need not result in greater competitiveness
If the number of licenses exceeds the number of incumbents, we display
plausible conditions under which all incumbents get a license. Finally, we
suggest a positive role for some auction formats in which the number of
licenses is endogenously determined at the auction. We illustrate some
results with examples drawn from European license auctions for 3G mobile
telephony.
1. Introduction
Telecommunication, public transportation, electricity, water and gas were tradi-
tionally provided by (often monopolistic) state …rms. It is now widely believed
¤We are grateful for many helpful comments made by the participants at the conference
”Auctions and Market Structure” ,organized by the University of Mannheim, July 2000.
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that recent technological advances have undermined the ”natural monopoly” ar-
gument which has been often advanced in defense of such market structures1.
During the last two decades several industries have been radically transformed by
the introduction of competition2. The liberalization was implemented in di¤erent
ways, according to region and industry. In the telecommunication industry com-
petition was created by licensing several private …rms. There are, a priori, many
ways to allocate licenses. For example, the allocation of …rst generation licenses
for mobile telephony was made through lottery or through bureaucratic processes
(so called ”beauty contests”). Given that resale markets for licenses do not func-
tion well and are often subject to bureaucratic controls, and given that potential
acquirers of licenses are better informed than regulators, it soon became clear
that such methods lead to suboptimal allocations of licenses and that they do not
generate substantial revenues. Further allocations of licenses were made through
auctions (see McMillan, 1994 and McAfee and McMillan, 1996 for accounts of the
US experience, and Klemperer, 2000 for the UK).
The main goal of most spectrum license auctions is economic e¢ciency, which
implies that some weighted sum of consumers’ and producers’ surpluses should
be maximized. Although it is invariably less advertised, revenue is also an impor-
tant part of the agency’s objective function because governments tend to prefer
solutions that require less subsidies (or even provide budgetary surpluses).
The di¢culty in achieving e¢ciency is due to the fact that consumers do not di-
rectly participate at spectrum auctions3. Moreover, ex-ante estimates of expected
consumers’ surplus in future market scenarios are di¢cult to make. Therefore,
consumers’ surplus does not play a natural role in shaping the auction’s outcome,
unless a regulatory agency provides a design that explicitly takes it into account.
Since standard oligopoly models predict that in reasonable ranges both consumers’
surplus and overall e¢ciency increase with increased competition among …rms, the
creation of su¢cient market competition becomes a proxy goal that can be more
1The argument has been …rst articulated by John Stuart Mill in 1848: ”It is obvious, for
example, how great an economy of labor would be obtained if London were supplied by a single
gas or water company instead of the existing plurality...Were there only one establishment, it
could make lower charges consistently with obtainig the rate of pro…t now realized. (Mill 1926,
p.143)”
2In many countries, competition has been accompanied by the creation of powerful, industry
speci…c regulatory agencies.
3Another, more technical hurdle is presented by the fact that, in complex situations …tting
well some spectrum auction environments, multi-unit e¢cient auctions simply do not exist and
second-best mechanisms are not yet known (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1998).
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or less successfully implemented by the regulatory agency. Of course, entry cannot
be e¢ciently extended without limit since infrastructure costs are very high.
The di¢culty in achieving more competitive industries by licensing new …rms is
due to the fact that earlier allocations of licenses have already established incum-
bents operating according to some previous technological standard. Potential new
entrants (i.e., …rms that do not already operate a network) face two handicaps: 1)
The …xed cost of setting up a network (say of antennae and relays) is very large.
In contrast, a substantial part of the incumbents’ …xed costs are already sunk,
since they can use parts of their already existing facilities. 2) Incumbents are also
driven by entry pre-emption motives which translate into increased willingness to
pay for new licenses.
Excellent examples are provided by the British, Dutch and German license
auction for ”third generation (3G)” mobile telephony4. First generation networks
o¤ered simple analogue voice telephony; current systems (2G) added some data
services like fax and e-mail; 3G networks (using the UMTS standard) should be
capable of providing transmission rates up to 2 Megabites per second, and thus
the prospect of high-resolution video, multimedia, mobile o¢ce, virtual banking,
and many other on-line services.
Both Germany and the UK have 4 incumbents o¤ering 2G services5 according
to the GSM standard, and various economic viability estimates, together with
physical spectrum limitations implied that no more than 6 …rms could be licensed.
Licenses were awarded for 20 years in both countries, and resales were not allowed.
Considerations about the ”right” number of licenses played a major role in the
design of both auctions. Holland has 5 GSM incumbents.
The UK designers considered …rst an auction for 4 licenses6, but then settled
on 5, one more than the number of incumbents. The frequency capacities attached
to each license were …xed ex-ante, but di¤erent licenses came with di¤erent ca-
pacities, and the largest license has been reserved for a new entrant. Hence, the
UK design actively tried to level the playing …eld among incumbents and new
entrants. This auction attracted 9 potential new entrants besides the 4 incum-
bents. In contrast, the Dutch designers did not recognize that reserving licenses
for entrants is necessary, and sold exactly 5 licenses. That auction attracted one
4Our model will apply to examples from other industries, such as power generation (see for
example Cameron, Cramton and Wilson, 1997)
5Some other …rms buy services from incumbents and resell them, but do not have networks.
6The initial design called for a simultaneous auction followed by a sealed bid stage among
the 5 last bidders on the 4 licenses. The merits of this ”Anglo-Dutch” auction are discussed in
Klemperer (2000).
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potential new entrant. The German design was more, since it allowed outcomes
with 4, 5 or 6 licenses. Besides an endogenous number of licenses, the design also
allowed for endogenous capacity endowments7. This is its main weakness, since,
in principle, it allows incumbents to completely preempt entry by bidding for ad-
ditional capacity. In a companion paper (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2000) we analyze
this speci…c design in more detail. The German auction attracted 3 potential new
entrants.
It is interesting to note that, in all auctions mentioned above, all respective
incumbents got licenses. While there was no entry in Holland, an entrant (un-
avoidably) bought the reserved license in the UK. There were two new entries in
Germany, but the process by which the outcome was reacheed is amusing: after
the stage where 6 …rms were left in the auction (which equaled the maximal pos-
sible number of licenses and meant that the auction could end) and an aggregate
bid of DM 63 billion, the incumbents continued to try to acquire additional capac-
ity and hence, simultaneously, to reduce the number of available licenses. Faced
with determined entrants and nervous investors, they ultimately gave up without
any change in the physical outcome. But all …rms were another DM 35 billion
poorer !
It is instructive to recall here also the result of the October 1999 German
auction of capacity to the 4 GSM incumbents. The auction covered 10 duplex
packages8. T-Mobil and Mannesmann, the …rst mobile operators in Germany,
are much larger than two later entrants. Besides a need for additional capacity
in congested areas, the large players were most likely driven by a preemptive
motive. The auction was conducted in a simultaneous ascending format and
proceeded as follows: After the …rst round, the high bidder on all 10 packages
was Mannesmann, which o¤ered DM 36.360.000 for each of the packages 1-5, DM
40.000.000 for each of the packages 6-9 (which, recall, are identical to packages
1-5), and DM 56.000.000 for the larger package 10. In the second round, T-Mobil
bid9 DM 40.010.000 on packages 1-5, and the auction closed. Here is what one of
T-Mobil’s managers said: ”No, there were no agreements with Mannesmann. But
Mannesmann’s …rst bid was a clear o¤er. Given Game Theory, it was expected
that they show what they want most.” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October
7Bids were made on 12 spectrum packages. A …rm must acquire at least two packages in
order to be licensed, but can acquire up to three packages.
8The …rst nine packages were identical, consisting of 2£ 1 MHz, and the tenth consisted of
2£ 1:4 MHz.
9Minimum increments had to be 10% of the last high bid.
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29, 1999, p.13)
In this paper we consider a situation in which several incumbents are already
present in the market. A regulatory agency sells one or more licenses. It can de-
termine the number of auctioned licenses and some features of the auction format.
Potential acquirers of new licenses include the incumbents10 and entrants who are
not yet present in the market. The downstream competition among licensed …rms
is modeled via a reduced-form industry pro…t function. This modeling approach
implies that values for licenses are endogenous, and depend on the …nal number
of licensed …rms11.
For simplicity, but also in order to isolate the e¤ect of market structure con-
siderations, we assume that there are no informational asymmetries among the
potential acquirers.
We focus on two objectives for the regulatory agency: the degree of compet-
itiveness in the industry and the revenue generated by the auction. The degree
of competitiveness is measured by the number of licensed …rms after the auction
(that is, the number of incumbents augmented by the number of entrants who
acquire a license)12.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the underlying
IO model. In Section 3 we analyze a one-license auction with n incumbents, and
the incumbents’ incentives to collude. In Section 4 we study auctions for several
licenses (with possible supply uncertainty). We also study an auction in which the
number of licenses is endogenously determined by the bid structure. Concluding
comments are gathered in Section 5.
10Incumbents may possibly ”hide” their identity behind a new name if they are legally not
allowed to acquire a new license .
11The e¤ect of entry on pro…ts are well-documented. Consider the following quotations: ”The
arrival of four new PCS carriers in some US cities - breaking up the old cellular duopolies
that had existed before - has driven down prices, one of the factors behind the growth in new
subscribers” (Financial Times, Friday February 5, 1999)
”Israeli Cable …rms complained that the approval of direct broadcast satellite television (DBS)
was an unfair infringement on their monopoly. The High Court of Justice dismissed the petition,
but ordered the government to negotiate some kind of compensation. Under a recent deal,
the cable companies will receive permission to embark in a new …eld of operation - domestic
communications in exchange for giving up their exclusive rights to most television channels and
agreeing to share programming with DBS operators.” (Haaretz, Tuesday, February 9, 1999).
12As mentioned above, the positive correlation between competitiveness and consumers’ sur-
plus can be made speci…c by adding extra structure about aggregate demand. But that extra
structure is rarely accessible to the regulatory agency at the time of the auction, and the public
debate often revolves around the degree of competitiveness that the auction induces.
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Our main insights are as follows. Suppose that incumbents currently earn large
pro…ts, that old and new licenses are close substitutes, and that the addition of
one licensed entrant causes a signi…cant drop in per-…rm pro…t in the industry13.
Then bidding among incumbents displays ”war of attrition” features: since entry
preemption has a public good aspect, incumbents are willing to buy new (even
”worthless”) licenses or capacity in order to avoid entry, while, at the same time,
preferring that the cost of preemption is born by others.
If only one license is auctioned, the war of attrition leads to entry with positive
probability. In this case we also show that the incentives for explicit collusion
are highest when the expected bene…t for entrants is approximately equal to the
di¤erence between the incumbents’ post- and pre-entry pro…ts.
The war of attrition between incumbents can be alleviated if several licenses
are auctioned, resulting in less entry. The point is that, with more licenses, the
cost of preemption can be more easily shared among incumbents (even though
the cost is higher). If the number of licenses equates the number of incumbents,
each of them can purchase one license. This completely preempts entry, and the
cost is equally shared among incumbents. Recall that this was the outcome of the
Dutch 3G auction.
The above insight suggests that auctioning the maximum possible number of
licenses need not induce a higher degree of competitiveness. Restricting supply is
a way to combat tacit collusion and to induce more entry. Another way to combat
tacit collusion is to use sequential auctions with some supply uncertainty about
the number of future licenses14. In some cases, this format induces more entry
than supply restriction.
If the number of licenses exceeds the number of incumbents, we display plau-
sible conditions under which all incumbents get a license. This result …ts the
outcome of the German and UK 3G license auctions.
Our analysis points out that the induced entry and revenue obtained in various
auction formats crucially depends on the relation between the number of incum-
bents and the number of auctioned licenses. We also note that competitiveness
and revenue may be both positively or negatively correlated, depending on the
parameters of the model.
13Possibly, because prior to entry the incumbent …rms managed to achieve some form of
collusion.
14Although clearly unintended, the Spanish government is using such a procedure. After the
…rst 3G licenses were awarded last year (for free, via a beauty contest), the government now
considers to create a new license and sell it through auction.
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Finally, we brie‡y review an auction format proposed by GTE (in the universal
service context) in which the winners of the auction are those bidders who have
submitted bids in a given range below the highest bid (say 15% within the highest
bid). Thus, the number of new licenses is endogenously determined by the bid
structure. Such auction formats may prevent the incumbents from achieving a
totally collusive agreement, and we suggest that they can perform better than a
systematic supply restriction of new licenses. On the other hand, the endogeniza-
tion of the number of licenses must be carefully done in order to avoid designs
such as the German one discussed above.
1.1. Related literature
The analysis performed here is related to models considered in the literature
on patent licensing, pioneered in Arrow (1962) (see the survey of Kamien, 1992).
Gilbert and Newbery (1982) use an auction model to study the interaction between
a monopolist incumbent and a potential entrant competing for an innovation.
Their main result is the persistence of the monopolist which takes into account
the potential negative externality and uses preemptive patenting. Krishna (1993,
1999) and Gale and Stegeman (2000) study sequential auctions of inputs and
show that monopoly may not persist in that context. Rodriguez (1997) studies
sequential license auctions in a model with incumbents and entrants. He imposes
conditions on the reduced-form downstream pro…t functions which directly induce
sure entry at each auction (unless the initial market structure is monopolistic, in
which case the Gilbert-Newbery result applies). McAfee (1998) studies capacity
auctions in oligopolies where some …rms are capacity constrained, and points out
the resulting externalities. He shows that unconstrained …rms may win the auction
in some cases.
Kamien and Tauman (1986), Kamien, Tauman and Oren (1992) and Katz and
Shapiro (1985, 1986) study patent licensing in oligopolistic downstream industries
and speci…cally point out the presence of allocative externalities among …rms.
These authors assume that all …rms are ex-ante symmetric15 - this is the key
di¤erence between theirs and our work. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996a) allow for
ex-ante asymmetries among the downstream competing …rms and focus on the
incentives to participate in an auction for a cost-reducing innovation protected
15This assumption is common in practically the entire literature on vertical relations - see
Segal, 1999 for a theoretically unifying approach. An exception is Rockett, 1990 who studies
the externalities caused by asymmetric licensees on the licensor (but not on each other).
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by a patent. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1997) and Jehiel et. al. (1996b, 1999)
look at models where one object is auctioned and where agents possess private
information about imposed or incurred externalities. The focus in the last two
papers is on mechanism design and on revenue maximizing sales procedures16.
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) provides a detailed study and critique of the special
German design for the 3G license auction.
The free-riding phenomenon among incumbents is connected to the positive
externality identi…ed in the literature on mergers (see Perry and Porter 1985,
McAfee and Williams 1988, Farrell and Shapiro 1990). However, this literature
does not discuss the resulting war of attrition. For an analysis of such a war
of attrition in a bargaining context, see Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a,b). The
possibility of collusive-like outcomes in auctions for several objects has been stud-
ied by Wilson (1979) and Anton and Yao (1992), and more recently by Ausubel
and Schwarz (1999), Brusco and Lopomo (1999), and Klemperer (2000). Papers
that focus on informational asymmetries in market design are Auriol and Laf-
font (1992), Dana and Spier (1994), McGuire and Riordan (1995), and Milgrom
(1996). Jehiel and Moldovanu (1998) o¤er a general (and abstract) perspective on
e¢cient multi-object auctions with allocational and informational externalities.
2. The Model
We consider an industry with n incumbents. New …rms can enter the market by
acquiring licenses from a regulatory agency. We assume that there arem potential
entrants.
The regulatory agency organizes an auction for new licenses. New licenses may
di¤er in speci…cation from the licenses owned by incumbents. Our model allows for
various forms of substitutability/complementarity between old and new licenses.
In each feasible con…guration, we assume that …rms’ pro…ts solely depend
on the number of active …rms after the auction. That is, suppose k licenses are
auctioned and suppose s · k entrants acquire a license (and thus k¡s incumbents
acquire a new license). Then the number of active …rms after the auction is n+ s,
and all payo¤s depend on n+ s as follows:
1. An unsuccessful entrant receives a payo¤ of zero.
16A major problem with the revenue-maximizing procedures in the presence of externalities
is that the seller needs an unrealistically strong commitment power in order to implement the
rather sophisticated optimal schemes.
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2. A successful entrant receives a payo¤ of we(n+ s).
3. An unsuccessful incumbent receives a payo¤ of ¼(n+ s).
4. A successful incumbent receives a payo¤ of wi(n+ s).
We assume that the pro…t functions ¼; we, wi are decreasing in their ar-
guments. We also assume that 8t; wi(t) ¸ ¼(t), and we(t) ¸ 0: We denote
v(t) ´ wi(t)¡ ¼(t). All pro…t functions are assumed to be common knowledge
among bidders. The status quo corresponds to the case k = 0.
It is convenient to denote d(n) = d = ¼(n)¡¼(n+1)
we(n+1)
and g(n) = g = v(n)
we(n+1)
.
The parameter d will be called the market structure parameter , whereas g will
be called the direct bene…t parameter.
The above setup is su¢ciently general to cover many applications of interest.
For example, if new and old licenses are perfect substitutes, then ¼ ´ we ´ wi
and v ´ 0. If they are imperfect substitutes and a new license is more valuable
to incumbents than an old one, then v > 0. If entrants have to incur a …xed cost
c to catch up the incumbents’ advantage, but old and new licenses are otherwise
perfect substitutes, then ¼ ´ wi and we ´ ¼ ¡ c , and so on17...
In some applications we extend the model and allow the payo¤ functions we
and v to depend also on the number of new licenses k (besides the dependence on
the number of active …rms). These functions will be then denoted by wke (n + s)
and vk(n + s), respectively. Such an extension is needed if the pro…t induced
by the new license has some component which depends on the speci…c market
structure associated with the new license market18.
Incumbents on the one hand, and entrants on the other are assumed to be
symmetric. This is to highlight the e¤ect of the asymmetry between incumbents
and entrants (rather than the asymmetry within a given group). Throughout the
paper, we focus on equilibria where symmetric bidders use symmetric strategies,
and where bidders do not use (weakly) dominated strategies.19 To ensure the
existence of equilibria in our complete information models we need tie-breaking
assumptions: these are tailored to the speci…c auctions (an equivalent alternative
17The model also covers the case (which is less interesting from the viewpoint of this paper)
in which the activities of the two licenses are completely independent. This corresponds to ¼
being constant.
18For example, consider the markets for 3G and 2G mobile telephony.
19Equilibrium considerations would automatically yield the restriction to (weakly) undomi-
nated strategies if some private information perturbation, say on valuations, were introduced.
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is to introduce a smallest money unit). Basically, the tie-breaking rules say that
incumbents are treated symmetrically, and that high bidding entrants cannot get
licenses as long as there are unserved incumbents willing to make bids at least as
high.
3. Auctions for one license
In this Section we assume that there is one license for sale, i.e. k = 1. The
license is sold through a Vickrey or sealed-bid second price auction20. All bidders
simultaneously submit bids, which are non-negative real numbers. The bidder
with highest bid gets the license and pays the second highest bid for it.
The main thing to note is the fundamental di¤erence between incumbents and
potential entrants with respect to the nature of their willingness to pay: If an
entrant acquires the license at a price p · we(n+ 1), then it expects an increase
in payo¤ from zero to we(n+1)¡p; whereas the incumbents experience a decrease
of payo¤ from ¼(n) to ¼(n+ 1): If an incumbent acquires the license at a price p,
then he experiences a change in payo¤ from ¼(n) to ¼(n)+ v(n)¡p; and all other
incumbents receive ¼(n). Hence, an entrant is prepared to pay up to we(n + 1)
for a license, and an incumbent is prepared to pay up to ¼(n)¡ ¼(n + 1) + v(n)
or v(n) , depending on whether he expects an entrant or another incumbent to
acquire the license instead. The outcome of the auction will vary, depending on
the relation between we(n+1); ¼(n)¡¼(n+1)+v(n); and v(n): There are several
cases of interest:
1. Assume that d+g < 1 (i.e., ¼(n)¡¼(n+1)+v(n) < we(n+1)) In this case,
an entrant’s expected payo¤ we(n + 1) is higher than the maximum willingness
to pay of an incumbent21 ¼(n) ¡ ¼(n + 1) + v(n) . Entry occurs for sure, and,
assuming that there are at least two potential entrants, the successful entrant has
to pay we(n+ 1), which is the revenue of the auction.
2. Assume that 1 < g (i.e., we(n+ 1) < v(n)). In this case the direct bene…t
of an incumbent is by itself higher than the expected payo¤ an entrant. Entry is
not possible, and the preemption motive becomes irrelevant. At the auction the
incumbents compete for the license, the expected payo¤ of incumbents is ¼(n)
(i.e., the premium of the winning incumbent is dissipated in competition), and
the revenue is given by v(n).
20The English ascending price auction yields here the same results.
21This willingness to pay is the sum of the direct bene…t and the bene…t of preemption.
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3. Assume that g < 1 < d + g: In this case the entrants’ willingness to pay
we(n+ 1) is less than the incumbents’ willingness to pay for preemptive motives,
i.e. ¼(n) ¡ ¼(n + 1) + v(n), but more than the incumbents’ willingness to pay
for direct motives, i.e. v(n). If there is only one incumbent, then his willingness
to pay is unambiguously de…ned by ¼(n) ¡ ¼(n + 1) + v(n), and the incumbent
acquires the license with probability one22. An interesting phenomenon occurs
when there are n > 1 incumbents. A bidding ”war of attrition” takes place
among the incumbents, since their bids must balance two con‡icting interests: on
the one side they wish to pre-empt entry, but on the other side they wish to let
some other incumbent pay the price of preemption.
In order to ensure equilibrium existence we use the following tie-breaking rule:
an entrant with a highest bid cannot win the license if there exists at least an
incumbent that has made the same highest bid23. Moreover, if s incumbents tie
at the highest bid, then each wins the license with probability 1
s
:
Proposition 3.1. Assume that k = 1, and that there are n > 1 incumbents.
Assume also that g < 1 < d + g: Let ± = d
1¡g . The payo¤s of entrants and
incumbents are uniquely de…ned in a symmetric equilibrium. Each entrant bids
we(n + 1). Each incumbent bids we(n + 1) with probability q(±; n); and bids 0
(or below we(n + 1)) with probability 1 ¡ q(±; n), where q = q(±; n) is implicitly
de…ned by
± =
1¡ q
nq
¢ [(1¡ q)¡n ¡ 1]: (3.1)
A potential entrant gets the license with probability x(±; n) = (1¡ q(±; n))n; and
has a zero expected pro…t. An incumbent’s expected pro…t is given by:
vinc(±; n) = [1¡ (1¡ q(±; n))n¡1]¼(n) + (1¡ q(±; n))n¡1¼(n+ 1):
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibrium entry probability x(±; n) is entirely determined by the num-
ber n of incumbents and the parameter ± = d
1¡g , which aggregates the market
structure and the direct bene…t parameters. We have:
22This is the standard case of monopoly persistence (see Gilbert and Newbery, 1982).
23The obtained equilibrium corresponds to the limit as "! 0 of the equilibria obtained when
(1) all bidders with highest bid have the same probability of getting the license and (2) bids can
only take values of ", 2"; 3"; :::
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Proposition 3.2. Assume that g < 1 < d + g: In the one-license auction, the
probability of entry x(±; n) is a decreasing function of ± and an increasing function
of n.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is relatively intuitive that the probability of entry decreases in d and in g
(and thus in ±): for larger d, the incumbents are more willing to avoid entry, and
for larger g, the net cost of acquiring a license for an incumbent is smaller. It is
less straightforward to see that this probability decreases in n : on the one hand,
the free riding problem among incumbents becomes more severe as n increases,
which induces a higher probability of entry; on the other hand, for a given strategy
of incumbents, the probability that all n incumbents bid zero (and hence that an
entrant wins the license) is decreasing in n . Proposition 3.2 shows that the …rst
e¤ect is dominant.
The next Proposition establishes the overall behavior of the equilibrium entry
probability as a function of the number of incumbents n.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that the function ±(n) = d(n)
1¡g(n)decreases in n. Then
the probability of entry x(±(n); n) is a non-decreasing function of n .
Proof. We need to show x(±(n+ 1); n+ 1) ¸ x(±(n); n). There are several cases
to consider:
1. If ±(n) · 1 then ±(n + 1) · 1: In this case there is sure entry (whether
there are n or n+ 1 incumbents) and x(±(n+ 1); n+ 1) = x(±(n); n).
2. If ±(n+ 1) · 1 < ±(n) then there is sure entry with n+ 1 incumbents, but
not with n incumbents, so that x(±(n+ 1); n+ 1) = 1 ¸ x(±(n); n).
3. If ±(n) ¸ ±(n+ 1) ¸ 1;we obtain by Proposition 3.2:
x(±(n+ 1); n+ 1) ¸ x(±(n); n+ 1) ¸ x(±(n); n):
Whether or not the function d(n)
1¡g(n) is decreasing depends on the speci…c IO
context. For example, in the case of perfect substitutability where g = 0 and
we = ¼; the monotonicity of ±(n) reduces to the requirement that
¼(n)¡¼(n+1)
¼(n+1)
is
decreasing, which is satis…ed in many oligopoly models.
We conclude this subsection by presenting explicit formulae for n = 2 and
n = 3.
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Example 3.4. The solution of equation (3.1) for n = 2 is q = 2±¡2
2±¡1 ; and the
probability of entry is given by (1 ¡ q)2 = 1
(2±¡1)2 : The solution for n = 3 is
q = 1
2(3±¡1)
³
6± ¡ 3¡
q
(12± ¡ 3)
´
and the probability of entry is given by (1 ¡
q)3 = 1
8
³
1+
p
(12±¡3)
´3
(3±¡1)3 . The probabilities of entry as a function of ± are depicted
in the following …gure.
Insert Figure 1 here
3.1. Explicit collusion among incumbents
In this subsection we consider the possibility of explicit collusion24 among incum-
bents. We wish to compare the highest collusive payo¤ incumbents could achieve
(using any kind of mechanism) to the payo¤ they obtain in the non-collusive
bidding analyzed above25.
Let ¢C be the per-…rm pro…t of incumbents under perfect collusion and let
¢NC be the pro…t of incumbent …rms in the above symmetric equilibrium outcome.
The entrants’ willingness to pay is invariablywe(n+1):Note that when incumbents
collude, the price paid for the license is always we(n + 1); since the absence of
competition between incumbents drives down the price to entrants’ willingness
to pay of entrants.
We wish to compare the di¤erence ¢C¡ ¢NC to we(n+ 1), and we denote
¢ =
¢C ¡¢NC
we(n+ 1)
:
The higher this ratio, the higher the incumbents’ incentive to collude. There are
several cases of interest:
1. If g = v(n)
we(n+1)
> 1, then ¢NC = ¼(n), and ¢C = ¼(n) + v(n)¡we(n+1)
n
. Thus,
¢ = g¡1
n
. In this case, collusion among incumbents takes the standard form of
avoiding wasteful competition.
24By explicit collusion, we mean a situation where incumbents can fully agree on their bidding
behavior at the auction, and can make any kind of transfers between themselves, possibly outside
the auction.
25Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) study collusion in simpler IO setup, but with asymmetric infor-
mation among bidders. They show how market structure considerations may complicate the
information sharing among colluding bidders.
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2. If g < 1, the main incumbents’ motive for acquiring the license is to
preempt entry. The cost of preemption is determined by the entrants’ willingness
to pay, i.e. we(n + 1). Preemption is thus desirable for the incumbents’ ring
whenever n¼(n) + v(n)¡ we(n + 1) > n¼(n + 1), that is, whenever d1¡g > 1n ; in
which case ¢C = ¼(n) + v(n)¡we(n+1)
n
: If d
1¡g · 1n , entry occurs for sure and we
have ¢C = ¼(n+ 1). This yields for g < 1:
¢ =
8>><>>:
0 if d
1¡g · 1n
d¡ 1¡g
n
if 1
n
< d
1¡g < 1
(d+ g
n
)(1¡ q)n¡1 ¡ 1
n
if d
1¡g ¸ 1
For d
1¡g small enough, collusion is not bene…cial for the incumbents: in the
non-cooperative equilibrium, an entrant gets the license and there is no point
to avoid that entry even when taking into account the pro…t loss incurred by
every incumbent. For 1
n
< d
1¡g < 1, there is some bene…t of collusion: In the
non-cooperative outcome there is sure entry, because the cost to an individual
incumbent does not justify preemption; however, taking into account the loss of
every incumbent it is worth preempting entry. For d
1¡g > 1 there is a clear bene…t
of collusion, that of avoiding the risk that an entrant gets the license with some
positive probability.
Observe that ¢ = 0 for d
1¡g · 1n and that ¢ tends to 0 as ± = d1¡g tends to
in…nity26. Collusion is not very bene…cial when d
1¡g is very large because, despite
the war of attrition, an entrant very rarely gets the license in the non-cooperative
equilibrium. This suggests that we should expect more collusion among incum-
bents when the market structure parameter is neither too low nor too large.
Example 3.5. For illustrative purposes, consider the explicit formulae for n =
2; 3 and g = 0:
¢ =
8><>:
0 if d · 1
2
d¡ 1
2
if 1
2
< d < 1
d
2d¡1 ¡ 12 if d ¸ 1
for n = 2
and
26To see this, recall expression 3.1 and note that q tends to 1 when ± tends to in…nity. Then,
plug the expression of ± to show that ±(1¡ q)n¡1 tends to 1n :
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¢ =
8>>><>>>:
0 if d · 1
3
d¡ 1
3
if 1
3
< d < 1
d
³
1+
p
(12d¡3)
´2
4(3d¡1)2 ¡ 13 if d ¸ 1
for n = 3
The following …gure plots the relative bene…t of collusion as a function of d
and reveals that this bene…t is maximal at d = 1:
Insert Figure 2 here.
4. Multi-License Auctions
In this Section we analyze the e¤ect of auctioning several licenses. We consider
the Vickrey auction (which extends here the sealed-bid second-price auction used
for k = 1): each bidder i submits a bid bi; the bidders with the k highest bids get
a license each and pay the (k + 1) highest bid. That is, rearranging the bids in
increasing order, bi(1) ¸ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¸ bi(k) ¸ bi(k+1) ¸ ¢ ¢ ¢, every bidder i(1), ¢ ¢ ¢; i(k) gets
a license and pays bi(k+1)27. The simultaneous ascending price version (where the
price gradually increases until there are k remaining bidders who each obtains a
license and pays the current price) yields here the same results28.
4.1. When all incumbents get licensed
In the British UMTS auction there were 5 licenses, one more than the number
of GSM incumbents. All 4 incumbents obtained a new license. In light of our
model this is not surprising since, besides expecting a higher direct bene…t (due
to lower infrastructure costs), incumbents are also driven by preemption motives.
The following Proposition makes this observation precise.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that k > n and that ¼(k)¡¼(k+1)+v(k) > we(k). A
symmetric equilibrium of the k¡license auction is as follows: entrants bid we(k);
and incumbents bid above that (say ¼(k)¡ ¼(k + 1) + v(k)). All incumbents get
a license, and k ¡ n entrants get a license. All licenses are sold, and the revenue
is given by kwe(k).
27We describe below the appropriate tie-breaking rule guaranteeing the existence of
equilibrium.
28The same applies here for the ascending format used by the FCC (see Milgrom, 2000).
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Proof. If the above strategy pro…le is played, entrants get a payo¤ of zero, and
incumbents get a payo¤ of wi(k) ¡ we(k) = v(k) + ¼(k) ¡ we(k). The above
strategies form an equilibrium because: 1) Given that all other …rms bid at least
we(k) and given that all licenses are sold, incumbent i has no incentive to bid below
that since this would give him a payo¤ of ¼(k + 1) < v(k) + ¼(k) ¡ we(k) ; 2)
Given that an entrant expects that n out of k licenses will be sold to incumbents,
the value of a license to an entrant is we(k).
Two cases must be qualitatively distinguished in the interpretation of Propo-
sition 4.1. If v(k) > we(k), incumbents intrinsically value the license more
than entrants, and therefore it is legitimate that they are served …rst. But
they continue to be licensed with probability 1 even if v(k) < we(k), as long
as ¼(k)¡ ¼(k + 1) + v(k) > we(k). This corresponds to the preemptive motive.
Suppose now that the number of auctioned licenses k coincides with the num-
ber of incumbents n. This was the Dutch case (5 licenses, 5 incumbents) where
no entry occured.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that ¼(n)¡¼(n+1)+v(n) > we(n+1). The following
strategies de…ne an equilibrium of the Vickrey auction with k = n licenses: In-
cumbents bid above we(n+1), say ¼(n)¡¼(n+1)+v(n). Entrants bid we(n+1).
The incumbents acquire one license each at price we(n + 1). There is no entry
and total revenue is nwe(n+ 1).
Proof. The above strategies form an equilibrium because: 1) Given that incum-
bent i bids above we(n+1), incumbent i0 has no incentive to bid below we(n+1):
Incumbent i0 would then leave one license to an entrant, and his resulting payo¤
would be ¼(n+ 1) < ¼(n) + v(n)¡ we(n+ 1) ; 2) Given that an entrant expects
that all other licenses go to incumbents, the value of a license to an entrant is
we(n+ 1).
As in the case k > n, two scenarios must be qualitatively distinguished in
the above Proposition according to how g(n) compares to 1. If g(n) > 1, the
direct bene…t for the new license is superior for incumbents than for entrants, and
therefore it is legitimate that incumbents acquire a license.
If g(n) < 1, entrants intrinsically value the new license more than incumbents
do. However, when d(n)+g(n) > 1, incumbents are willing to acquire one license
each, so that no entrant can get in this market. It is interesting to compare this
result with the one derived under the same conditions in the one-license auction:
there, an entrant had a positive probability of getting a license due to the war of
attrition between the incumbents. When k = n licenses are auctioned, there is
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an easy way to share the price of preemption: each incumbent buys one license,
and the war of attrition disappears, leading to prefect preemption. Restricting
attention to the equilibria displayed in Propositions 3.1 and 4.2, we get:
Corollary 4.3. Suppose that d(n) + g(n) > 1 > g(n). The expected number
of entries when one license is auctioned is higher than the expected number of
entries when k = n licenses are auctioned.
Remark: Proposition 4.2 has displayed one equilibrium of the n-license Vick-
rey auction, but sometimes several equilibria exist. To illustrate the point, assume
that there are n = 2 incumbents, and that 2 licenses are sold. If d(3) + g(3) > 1,
the above equilibrium outcome is the unique outcome of symmetric equilibria in
undominated strategies. If d(3) + g(3) < 1, there is another symmetric equilib-
rium that induces a very di¤erent outcome: entrants bid we(4); and incumbents
bid below we(4). Hence two entrants get new licenses at price we(4).
The multiplicity in the case d(3)+g(3) < 1 < d(2)+g(2) is caused, essentially,
by a coordination problem among incumbents. If incumbent 1 expects incumbent
2 to make a low bid, the question is whether there will eventually be 3 or 4 active
…rms in the industry. Since d(3) + g(3) < 1, incumbent 1 is also not willing to
acquire a license. If incumbent 1 expects incumbent 2 to make a high bid, the
question is whether there will eventually be 2 or 3 active …rms, and incumbent 1
is then willing to acquire a new license (since d(2) + g(2) > 1).
From the point of view of incumbents29, the full preemption equilibriumPareto-
dominates the full entry equilibrium. The risk-dominance analysis is complicated
due to the fact that the entrants use di¤erent strategies in each equilibrium. A
simple case in which this di¢culty does not arise is the one where we(3) = we(4)
and g(3) = g(4) = 0. Then entrants have a (weakly) dominant strategy: bid
we(3) = we(4). In a Vickrey auction where incumbents are restricted to make a
bid below we(3) or a bid above we(3), we can apply the standard de…nition of
risk-dominance (see Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) and we …nd that the full preemp-
tion equilibrium risk-dominates the full entry equilibrium whenever d(2) > 2:30
In our discussion we will mostly focus on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
29Entrants get 0 anyway.
30In the ascending price version, the risk-dominance criterion is slightly di¤erent (giving some
more advantage to the fully preemptive equilibrium), but the criteria become identical in the
limit where the number m of entrants gets very large.
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4.2. Supply restriction
Corollary 4.3 shows that an auction for one license may induce more entry than an
auction for n licenses when d(n)+g(n) > 1, g(n) < 1 and the functions v and we do
not depend on k . If the primary concern is to induce more competitiveness, and
at most n licenses can be auctioned,31 then restricting the number of auctioned
licenses may be desirable. Note that revenue is undoubtedly higher in the n-license
auction (where it is equal to nwe(n + 1)) than in the one-license auction (where
it is equal to we(n+1)). Hence the tension between competitiveness and revenue
is acute. The rest of this subsection considers several forms of supply restriction,
and also considers the case where more than n licenses can be auctioned.
4.2.1. Optimal deterministic supply restriction
Given the above general observation, it makes sense to ask what is the optimal
number of licenses from the point of view of inducing entry. This turns out to
be a di¢cult question even in the perfect information setting considered here.
The main di¢culty is that whenever d(n) + g(n) > 1 and g(n) < 1, the k-license
auction with k < n has the structure of a war of attrition with k objects, and it
is very hard to compare the probabilities of entries for the various k, k < n.
We provide a partial answer to the above question in a setting where the
bene…t functions vk and wke depend on the number k of auctioned licenses. We
let dk, gk be the corresponding market structure and direct bene…t parameters32.
Proposition 4.4. Fix k < n; and assume that dn(n) + gn(n) > 1 and that
gk(n) < 1 if and only if k ¸ k . Assume also that there are at most k = n licenses.
Then the expected number of entries is maximized for k0 2 [k; n¡ 1]:
Proof. We have gk(n) > 1 for k < k. Thus if k < k licenses are auctioned,
incumbents acquire all of them, and there is no entry. By Proposition 4.2, there
is no entry either if k = n licenses are auctioned. If k licenses are auctioned, there
is entry with positive probability whether or not dk(n) + gk(n) > 1. Hence the
maximum must occur for k0 2 [k; n¡ 1]:
Remark: It is more likely that gk(n) is a decreasing function of k, since
bene…ts associated with the new licenses are probably larger when fewer new
licenses are available. The assumption on gk(n) is then plausible.
31For example. in some cases there are capacity limitations that physically limit the number
of possible licenses.
32In the next Proposition, we consider the Pareto-e¢cient symmetric equilibrium.
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Proposition 4.4 shows that a transition from k = n to k < n may be bene…cial
for competitiveness . But what about situations in which more than n licenses
can be auctioned? Obviously, if 2n ¡ 1 or more licenses are auctioned, at least
n ¡ 1 entrants will acquire a license, and there is no way to induce a higher
competitiveness by auctioning k < n licenses.
Assume then that at most k < 2n¡1 licenses can be auctioned. The following
Proposition identi…es simple circumstances under which, in case k < n; more
entry is expected than in the cases where k 2 [n; 2n¡ 2].
Proposition 4.5. Assume that for all k, we(k) = we, v(k) = v, ¼(k) ¡ ¼(k +
1) = ¢¼ > 0 and that ¢¼+v
we
= 1 + " > 1. Then, if " is small enough, for all
k 2 [0; 2n¡ 2] ; the expected number of entries is maximized when n¡ 1 licenses
are auctioned.
Proof. If k ¸ n licenses are auctioned, Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 show that all
incumbents get licensed. Hence, the number of entries is 0 (if k = n) or k ¡ n (if
k > n).
If k < n licenses are auctioned, there is a war of attrition phenomenon. En-
trants bid we; and incumbents use a mixed strategy33: bid we with probability
q; and bid 0 with probability 1 ¡ q. In equilibrium an incumbent has to be in-
di¤erent between bidding 0 and bidding we. Bidding we is e¤ective and hence
advantageous relatively to a bid of 0 only if at most k ¡ 1 other incumbents bid
we. The net gain provided by such a bid is ¢¼ + v ¡ we = "we: If k or more
incumbents bid we; such a bid has a cost of at least kn(we ¡ v) > 034. As " goes
to 0, the probability q must also converge to 0 (so that the indi¤erence condition
continues to hold). When q is close to 0, there are approximately k entries on
expectation, hence the number of entries is maximized by setting k = n¡ 1.
The intuition for Proposition 4.5 is as follows. Given that ¢¼+v > we, Propo-
sitions 4.1 and 4.2 guarantee that if k ¸ n licenses are auctioned all incumbents
get a license. Thus, if k ¸ n the number of entries is increasing in k: If k < n
licenses are auctioned, the condition ¢¼+v
we
= 1+ " implies that v < we for " small
enough. Thus, we are in the war of attrition regime in which the incumbent’s in-
trinsic value for the new license is lower than that of entrants, but the preemption
value is higher. The outcome of this war of attrition depends on the magnitude of
¢¼+ v¡we. When ¢¼+ v¡we is small, the surplus to be gained by preemption
33Remember that we restrict attention to incumbent-symmetric equilibria.
34Note that this expression does not converge to 0 as " gets small.
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is small, and therefore incumbents do not bid above we with a high probability.
This results in almost k entries, and Proposition 4.5 follows.
The conditions displayed in Proposition 4.5 are obviously restrictive35. How-
ever, Proposition 4.5 clearly shows that auctioning less licenses may induce more
entry. The main reason is that preemption takes the strategic form of tacit collu-
sion if k ¸ n and the form of an war of attrition if k < n.
4.2.2. Random Supply
Another way to restrict supply is to have a random number of licenses. We illus-
trate the potential bene…t of random supply in an example with two incumbents:
one license is auctioned …rst (through a sealed bid second price auction), and then
a second license is auctioned with probability u36. The probability u is common
knowledge. Note that u = 0 corresponds to the one-license auction studied in
Section 3 and that u = 1 corresponds to a deterministic sequential two-license
auction (which leads here to the same insights as the simultaneous two-license
Vickrey auction).
The following example exhibits a setting where the random supply auction
induces more entry than both a one-license and a two-license auction.
Example 4.6. Consider the case where old and new licenses are perfect substi-
tutes, i.e. g ´ 0, we ´ ¼. Suppose further that ¼(3) = ¼(4) (i.e., d(3) = 0) and let
d(2) = ¼(2)¡¼(3)
¼(3)
< 1: In the Appendix we show that there is a unique symmetric
Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. The expected number of entries is
N = (1¡ r(u))2(1 + u); where
r(u) =
d(2)¡ 1
d(2)¡ (1 + u)=2
Assuming that d(2) 2 (1; 3
2
); the expected number of entries N is maximal for
an interior probability u¤, 0 < u¤ < 1: (See Appendix.) The expected revenue
is given by R = (1 + u)¼(3), which is an increasing function of u; so that it is
maximized at u = 1.
35The independence with respect to k is unlikely to be satis…ed in most cases.
36Consider the following quotation from the UK’s Radiocommunications Agency information
brochure about UMTS licenses: ” It (the Government) will press in the international bodies
for more spectrum to be allocated, but the timing of extra spectrum being available is very
uncertain...there can be no guarantee that there will be an additional operator licensed in the
future.”
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Insert Figure 3 here
Increasing u has two e¤ects on the entry probability: on the one hand, if an
entrant acquires the …rst license, it increases the probability that a second entrant
gets a license37 (direct e¤ect); on the other hand, it reduces the intensity of the
war of attrition on the …rst license (since r(u) is an increasing function of u), which
implies that the probability that an entrant gets the …rst license is a decreasing
function of u. The optimal probability u has to balance these two e¤ects.
4.3. Endogenous license supply
In all auction formats analyzed above, the number of licenses did not depend on
bidders’ behavior at the auction. We now consider an auction format in which the
number of licenses is endogenously determined by the bid structure38. Speci…cally,
consider the following auction format (inspired by a proposal submitted by GTE).
All bidders simultaneously submit bids. Let bmax be the highest bid. All bidders
i who have submitted a bid bi in the interval [(1¡ h)bmax; bmax] get a license. The
number of winning bidders is thus endogenously determined. The scalar h 2 [0; 1]
is set exogenously, and is part of the description of the auction format. Suppose
there are k winners. Then each winning bidder must pay a price equal to the
(k + 1)-highest bid, that is, b(k+1).
In the following Proposition, we assume that we is a constant, i.e., independent
of the number of active …rms. We also denote g = v(n)
we
, dm =
¼(n)¡¼(n+m)
we
; and
±m =
dm
1¡g .
Proposition 4.7. Assume that there are n > 1 incumbents and m ¸ 1 entrants.
Assume that g < 1 and dm + g < 1. The following bidding strategies constitute
a symmetric Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies39: entrants bid we; each
incumbent bids b > we
1¡h with probability q
GTE , and bids 0 with probability
1¡ qGTE; where
qGTE = 1¡ (±m) 11¡n
37One could argue that there is no competitive value of having 4 rather than 3 active …rms
(since ¼(3) = ¼(4)). However, a similar insight holds if ¼(3) > ¼(4) as long as d(3) = ¼(3)¡¼(4)¼(4) <
1 . In such a case there is a clear positive competitive e¤ect of having 4 active …rms.
38Recall that this feature was also part of the German design for the UMTS license auctions.
39In the special case where ¼(n+1) = ¢ ¢ ¢ = ¼(n+m), this is the only symmetric equilibrium
in undominated strategies.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 1: Despite the fact that several licenses may be sold in equilibrium,
the incumbents do not achieve a highly collusive agreement. The equilibrium
bidding strategies still re‡ect the war of attrition among incumbents, and this
auction format induces more entry than the n-license Vickrey auction analyzed
in Proposition 4.2. It is also interesting to compare the entry induced by this
auction format with the entry induced when less than n licenses are auctioned.
For illustrative purpose, we compare with the entry induced by the one-license
auction.
There are two e¤ects which go in opposite direction. One the one hand, the
endogenous format exacerbates the market structure parameter and therefore it
may induce a lower entry probability . This comes form the observation that, for
m > 1; dm is likely to be larger than d = d1. On the other hand, assuming that
dm and d1 are close to each other, the nature of the respective wars of attrition
is such that the probability of entry is larger in the GTE auction. The point
is that the cost of bidding high is greater in the GTE auction than it is in the
one-license auction: In the GTE auction, when you bid high, you have to buy the
license whereas in the one-license auction, sometimes you do not need to buy it
if other incumbents have made a high bid as well. This in turn results in a lower
probability that incumbents bid high in the GTE auction than in the one-license
auction, and leads therefore to a larger entry probability.
Remark 2: In order to avoid the collusive equilibrium, it is important to keep
h constant (i.e., independent of the number of winning bidders). If the auction
format were such that, say, h was itself a decreasing function of the number of
winning bidders, then tacit collusion could again be achieved40.
To conclude this subsection, we note that the endogenous license auction may
be suitable to combat tacit collusion among incumbents, and that it may some-
times perform better than an auction with supply restriction41.
40By adjusting the bids, the incumbents could ensure that if one incumbent makes a low bid,
an entrant gets a license with probability 1.
41In the absence of asymmetries between incumbents and entrants, it is unclear whether
this type of auction is an adequate tool to select e¢cient market structure. If all bidders are
symmetric, but there are still market structure considerations because the more licensees the
lower the pro…t, then this type of auction may restrict the number of licenses precisely to a
point where one additional license would cause the pro…t to drop a lot (and this may sometimes
be a signal that this additional license would be very valuable to the consumers).
22
5. Concluding Comments
We have analyzed the auction of new licenses in an oligopolistic industry. The fo-
cus was on the role of market structure considerations in determining the auction’s
outcome (in particular the number of licensed …rms, and the revenue obtained at
the auction). An important observation is that the auction format determines the
incumbents’ possibilities to preempt new entry in the market. In this context, the
relation between the number of new licenses and the number of incumbents plays
a major role. Finally, we have compared several theoretical results to the results
of several recent auctions of licenses in the telecommunication industry.
Most of the auction-theoretic literature focuses on informational problems. In
order to conduct a serious discussion about the merits of various auction designs
in the context of recent privatization and licensing processes it is necessary to
augment those ”classical” models by incorporating market structure elements.
6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Bidding we(n+1) is a dominant strategy for entrants,
and we now focus on incumbents. For the suggested strategy to be optimal, it
must be the case that each incumbent is indi¤erent between bidding zero and
bidding ¼(n+ 1):
Bidding zero yields an expected payo¤ of
(1¡ q)n¡1 ¢ ¼(n+ 1) + [1¡ (1¡ q)n¡1] ¢ ¼(n) =
¼(n)¡ (1¡ q)n¡1 ¢ [¼(n)¡ ¼(n+ 1)]:
Bidding we(n+ 1) yields an expected payo¤ of
n¡1X
j=0
³
n¡1
j
´
¢ (1¡ q)n¡1¡j ¢ qj [¼(n)¡ we(n+ 1)¡ v(n)
j + 1
] =
¼(n)¡ [we(n+ 1)¡ v(n)] ¢ [
n¡1X
j=0
³
n¡1
j
´
¢ (1¡ q)n¡1¡j ¢ qj ¢ 1
j + 1
]:
Equating the expected payo¤s from the two bids yields the following:
¼(n)¡ ¼(n+ 1)
we(n+ 1)¡ v =
n¡1X
j=0
³
n¡1
j
´
¢ ( q
1¡ q )
j ¢ 1
j + 1
(6.1)
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Noting that
Pn¡1
j=0
³
n¡1
j
´
¢ ( q
1¡q )
j ¢ 1
j+1
=
(1+ q
1¡q )
n¡1
n( q
1¡q )
we42 …nally obtain:
d
1¡ g =
1¡ q
nq
[(1¡ q)¡n ¡ 1] (6.2)
Let G(q) = 1¡q
nq
((1 ¡ q)¡n ¡ 1): Then limq!0G(q) = 1 and limq!1G(q) = 1:
Moreover, G0(q) > 0 for q 2 [0; 1]: Since by assumption d
1¡g ¸ 1; we obtain that
equation 6.2 has always a unique solution q¤ 2 [0; 1]. An entrant gets the license
only when all incumbents bid 0, hence the probability of entry is (1¡ q¤)n
Proof of Proposition 3.2: The equilibrium probability of entry x(±; n) is
implicitly de…ned by
± =
x
1
n
n(1¡ x 1n )
1¡ x
x
:
Let w(x; n) = x
1
n
n(1¡x 1n )
1¡x
x
. We will show that @w
@x
(x; n) < 0 and @w
@n
(x; n) > 0 so
that, by the implicit function theorem, @x
@n
= ¡@w=@n
@w=@x
> 0 and @x
@±
= 1
@w=@x
< 0 as
desired.
(i) @w
@n
> 0 is equivalent to
@
@m
[
mxm
1¡ xm ] < 0;
which is equivalent to
[1¡ xm + ln(xm)] x
m
(1¡ xm)2 < 0:
Since 1¡ z + ln z < 0 for z 2 (0; 1), we obtain @w
@n
(x; n) > 0:
(ii) @w
@x
(x; n) < 0 is equivalent (for y 2 (0; 1)) to
@
@y
ln(
y
1¡ y ¢
1¡ yn
yn
) < 0;
which is equivalent to
¡n(1¡ y) + 1¡ yn < 0:
This condition is easily checked43 for y 2 (0; 1). Hence, @w
@x
(x; n) < 0.
42To see this integrate (w.r.t. z) the following identity:
Pn¡1
j=0
¡
n¡1
j
¢ ¢ zj = (1 + z)n¡1:
43The function ¡n(1¡y)+1¡yn is equal to zero at y = 1. Its derivative is positive for y < 1.
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Example 4.6: It remains to analyze the incumbents’ equilibrium strategies.
Consider the second auction. If the …rst license has been acquired by an entrant
bidder, incumbent bidders bid below ¼(3) and an entrant gets the second license
at price ¼(3) (because d(3) = 0 < 1). If the …rst license has been acquired by
incumbent 1, then incumbent 2 bids above ¼(3) (say ¼(2)¡¼(3)) and he gets the
second license at price ¼(3) (because d(2) > 1).
Consider now the …rst auction. As in Section 3, the symmetric equilibrium
is in mixed strategies. Each incumbent bidder bids ¼(3) with probability r and
0 with probability 1 ¡ r. The probability r is computed so that an incumbent
bidder is indi¤erent between bidding 0; which yields
r(¼(2)¡ ¼(3)) + (1¡ ru)¼(3)
and bidding ¼(3), which yields
¼(2)¡ ¼(3) + r
2
(1¡ u)¼(3).
Equating these two expressions yields:
r =
d(2)¡ 1
d(2)¡ (1 + u)=2
The expressions for the expected number of entries and the expected revenue
easily follow44.
The result about revenue is immediate. For the expected number of entries,
observe that
N 0(0) = ¡ 2d(2)¡ 3
(2d(2)¡ 1)3 > 0; for d(2) 2 (1;
3
2
)
N 0(1) = 0; and N 00(1) =
1
(d¡ 1)2 > 0; for d(2) > 1
44The probability that an entrant acquires the …rst license is (1¡ r)2. Whenever an entrant
acquires the …rst license, there is sure entry on the second license when it takes place (which
occurs with probability u).
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Proof of Proposition 4.7: Entrants have a dominant strategy, to bid we.
Consider now an incumbent. Given the strategies of other bidders, a bid of 0 (or
any other bid strictly lower than (1¡ h)b) yields:h
1¡ (1¡ qGTE)n¡1
i
¼(n) + (1¡ qGTE)n¡1¼(n+m) (6.3)
(When one other incumbent bids b, no entrant acquires a license; when they all
bid 0, m entrants acquire a license.)
Any bid in the range ((1¡ h)b; we
1¡h) is dominated by a bid of b. Finally, a bid
of b or higher yields:
¼(n) + v(n)¡ we. (6.4)
The last expression follows because the incumbent bidder wins then a license, no
entrant is licensed, and every winner pays the entrants’ bid.
The probability qGTE is obtained by equating expressions 6.3and 6.4.
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